

DDP / 1-5-58-2

27 October 1961


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH-4

THROUGH: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Draft Memorandum, dated 26 October
1961 (attached)

1. I have no real quarrel with the attached document, but I would hope that we would follow the realistic and specific position adopted by Chief, WH-4 at the State Department meeting on 26 October. In other words, we have four major points which need settling with Miro according to an agreed upon line. In addition, we need to find out what other complaints Miro has and try to work out solutions acceptable to both sides. Finally, we must establish a working relationship between Wendell Johnson and Miro through which we can attempt to persuade Miro of the need of reconstituting his efforts in order to undertake a more constructive program than his present purely administrative one. In the meantime here in Washington we should be reexamining the whole question of how to deal with Cuban exiles with the thought that we may be able to present recommendations for a change in the present policy position. On this last point I have talked to Sherman Kent's office and hope in the near future to receive a report advising what the estimators think they can contribute on these last issues. At that time we can also get a time schedule.

2. I repeat, however, that for the moment let us concentrate on the major problems with Miro, eliminate the ambiguities which have existed between ourselves, State and the White House and try to obtain Miro's confidence in order to be more persuasive with him in the future.


C. TRACY BARNES
A/DDP/A

Attachment

Draft Memo

Original & 1 - C/WH-4 w/Att

1 - C/WH w/o Att

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*Inform 1 memo for discussion
with Mr. Burns, Mr. Zenger,
Col. Johnson and Mr. W. H. Lee
prior to 26 Oct 1961 Staff.*

D R A F T

1. It is our feeling that it would be desirable to deal with one representative of the Cuban exile movements and ~~one representative~~ of the Cuban underground. Need for coordination of activities alone makes this logical. However, we all recognize that both the exile movement and the underground are badly split into factions. It will be a continuous struggle to achieve cooperation between these factions, and to achieve complete unity as a practical political matter is not very realistic. Even within the Council, and within the FRD, there are elements which will cooperate with each other on some things and not on others. The experience with Justo CARRILLO and with Manolo RAY, among others, makes this amply clear.
2. ACcordingly, as discussed by Dr. MIRO with Mr. HANLEY and Mr. CLARK, in Baltimore in mid-September, there must be other unifying and coordinating factors than simply asserting the U. S. Government or some one agency will lend support through the CRC, and anyone who wants funds must go to the CRC. For example, it has ~~now~~ become apparent that the withdrawal of support from the AFJ, as requested by Dr. MIRO, has simply meant that the AFJ has become vocally opposed to the CRC. The leverage formerly exercised with the AFJ has now been removed. A¹ least ~~we~~ *formerly* we were ~~formerly~~ able to keep them from ~~criticizing~~ *unofficially* the CRC ~~no vocally~~.
3. We are sometimes dismayed to hear the charges made by Dr.

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MIRO that we are not supporting him exclusively. We feel that if we withdraw support from some of the other groups, they ^{might} become part of Dr. MIRO's opposition. At the same time, we are dismayed at the charges made by Dr. MIRO's opponents that, as in fact has been the case, a very large proportion of the support for Cuban exile activities has been given to him. The other groups claim, as he does, to have considerable influence over the underground and the exile community. They too have contacts in the various Departments of the U. S. Government and in business in the U. S. and abroad; and, as a long time practical politician, Dr. MIRO cannot be unaware of the implications of this situation.

4. We have, therefore, never agreed that ~~it~~ it was feasible to adopt the highly unrealistic view that exclusive support could be given to the CRC, since some other groups a) probably would unite against the CRC, b) could get support elsewhere, and, c) almost ~~inevitably~~ inevitably would organize a significant anti-CRC movement.

5. We have, therefore, made it known to all groups inside and outside that while we do not insist (except in the case of the judges) on unification and subordination to the CRC, we would prefer that they at least coordinate with the Council, ~~and~~ We have actively discouraged any criticism of the Council whenever we had an opportunity, ~~to do so~~.

6. Our position has been made difficult by the fact that Dr. MIRO has stated or implied to representatives of the various factions that he has high level U. S. Government sponsorship and ~~that~~ the factions can in the future only obtain support through him. He has also asserted to U. S.

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officials that he has presented proposals for assisting the underground and for aiding the underground to organize and has received no support from the Agency. The Agency is aware of the proposal to aid RAMIREZ, with whom at the time it was proposed in Baltimore, Dr. Miro said he had no communications line. We still do not know whether there is a communications line, or many of the ^{other} details needed to ~~be~~ assist RAMIREZ in the Escambray. If Dr. Miro now has such details, he might pass it to Colonel Johnson at a separate meeting. The Agency is aware of a ~~proposal~~ ^{proposal} for a 1,000 man invasion force ~~proposal~~ which was refused by both State and the White House before it was presented to the Agency. We see no purpose in commenting further on that plan. At such time as Dr. MIRO has specific plans for operations to aid the underground, he or his designee might ~~discuss~~ discuss them with Colonel Johnson.

7. We would like to point out that during the difficult months since April we have continued to urge the internal resistance groups to organize in a truly underground manner, to establish lines of command and channels of communications, and to look to the CRC for guidance. We know that in a number of instances the external representatives have sought to obtain guidance from the CRC only after our urging ~~them to do so~~. We would hope that Dr. MIRO will be frank enough to recognize these contacts, and the fact that thru these contacts he ~~has~~ been generally informed on the organizational activity in Cuba.

8. We would like to make special note for Dr. MIRO that we are

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not engaged in another invasion attempt, are not training Cubans for an invasion, and, therefore, cannot keep him informed on any such activity.

9. We would like to point out that Dr. MIRO has been in frequent contact during the past few months with the Department of State, representatives and has, as directed by the White House, taken his guidance from the State Department. He has rarely sought guidance or even utilized as a channel his contact with the Agency which has been continuously available. Many times it has been impossible to reach Dr. MIRO for us to arrange a meeting because he, according to ARAGON, was either ill, on a trip, or preparing for an interview with the State Department or the White House.

10. It is also worth mentioning that, as Dr. MIRO himself stated in various meetings, it is for security reasons neither possible or desirable to keep Dr. MIRO informed in detail of our activities affecting Cuba or at times certain Cuban exiles residing in this country ^{who are} and under our protection.

11. We have long felt there are certain aspects of our work which could have been done by the Frente, but because of lack of interest or leadership on the part of some, the Frente took the credit, but did little. We refer here specifically to propaganda. We feel that if the opposition to the CRC among the student and labor groups could be overcome, some very useful work could be done. We would point out that much of the DRE and

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FORD activities have been done with modest, and frequently without any, financial support. We feel that ideas, organization and persons with talent are much more important in these areas than money. We would like to urge once again that the FRD and the CRC take practical steps to work with the people in the DRE and the FORD. We certainly do not want to see the energies of these groups dissipated as has so clearly occurred in the case of the jurists.

12. We renew our proposal once again that Dr. MIRO have his people come up with some propaganda ideas and plans with or without DRE and FORD type participation, and we will give them our most sympathetic consideration.

13. Despite our misgivings as to the utility of the further support of the judiciary groups, we understand a commitment has been made to again advance Dr. MIRO \$5,000 for the judges and we are honoring this commitment.

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